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On the morning of 6 December 2011, we arrived 
in Imizamo Yethu as a small group of researchers1 
prepared to start a three-month action-research 
project on violence, local (dis)order and rule. As we 
drove into the township, we noticed that large rocks 
and tyres had been pushed into the road, blocking 
the way. Smoke drifted across the settlement and 
we saw broken glass and debris in the road. We 
started counting the numbers of cars with smashed 
windows. At the police station at the entrance to 
the township, a large group of angry people was 
gathered, shouting and arguing. 
Eventually, after speaking with various community 
leaders and residents, we were able to establish 
that there had been an outbreak the previous night 
of ‘taxi violence’, involving two different factions of 
the local Imizamo Yethu taxi operators. The dispute 
centred around the licencing process and access 
to lucrative taxi routes, with the more established 
association refusing entrance to others. When a 
second, less formalised group began to operate 
taxis in the area, the more formal group retaliated 
by attacking their cars and stabbing a driver. The 
situation then spiralled into a series of retaliations 
between the different taxi groups. 
What emerged on our first day in Imizamo Yethu 
was an indication of the complexities surrounding 
the pervasiveness of violence in the settlement, and 
the implications for social and political order: two 
taxi associations with uncertain links to competing 
factions of the South African National Civic 
Organisation (SANCO) local leadership; stories of 
episodic neighbourhood watches; and allegations 
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of local linkages between all of these and the main 
political parties in Cape Town. Over time, the frame of 
violence covered by our fieldwork extended to dealing 
with issues of crime, xenophobia and service delivery 
protests, but all of these were threaded through by 
the dynamics of local political rivalry and weak rule by 
both state and local leaders, as demonstrated by the 
taxi violence on our first day in Imizamo Yethu. 
By late 2015, while we were writing this article, 
Imizamo Yethu witnessed a popular mobilisation of 
unprecedented scale against two drug gangs, the 
amaXaba and the Bad Boys Company, whose turf 
battle had led to regular stabbings and even deaths 
over the preceding year. In August, a large vigilante 
group confronted and killed the leaders of both 
gangs. In the days that followed, SANCO leaders 
met with the remaining gang members to end the 
conflict and demobilise the gangs. Since that period 
a nightly community patrol has been in place that, by 
all accounts, has significantly reduced crime. Once 
again, local leaders reacted to the use of violence by 
other actors in Imizamo Yethu, although this time they 
endorsed the violence and new forms of coercion 
which united the community, local leaders and even 
the police. 
This article explores the relationship between 
violence, local rule and political actors in order to 
contribute to the current debate on social cohesion, 
inequality and security in cities of the global South. 
The relationship, we suggest, is a lot less linear than 
often assumed. We show how violence has not 
been used to gain or consolidate local leadership 
in Imizamo Yethu, at least not yet, and has been 
used only in exceptional cases to enforce local 
rule. Rather, violence is a pervasive and a constant 
background presence in many private and some 
public interactions, and is used to police particular 
moral views, such as the immorality of drug use – 
reinforcing the kind of social cohesion that leads to 
the vigilante mobilisation described above.
Rebelocracy and violence
Some influential recent literature on violence explores 
the linkages between micro-level analysis and meso- 
and macro-level analyses of conflict, in order to 
construct new arguments about the implications of 
violent conflict for wider political, economic and social 
processes,2 and the extent to which violence is used 
by particular groups to establish political order.3 Thus 
there is an emergent literature from conflict resolution 
studies exploring the relationships between armed 
actors and specific regimes of governance.4 This study 
interrogates some of the assumptions reflected in 
the literature with regard to how violence constitutes 
the political under conditions of weak state rule, and 
poses questions about social cohesion by revealing 
that weak social cohesion need not result in rule 
through violence. 
As part of the attempt to bridge different levels of 
analysis of violence, Ana Arjona offers a typology of 
authority regimes within civil and political conflict that 
entails a ‘degree of intervention of armed groups in 
civilian affairs’ and the ‘presence of social contract 
between armed group and local population’.5 Although 
this includes situations of civil war, in theory it includes 
any context in which state monopoly of violence is 
contested or filled by other armed non-state actors. 
Indeed, as Davis points out, this is a common 
phenomenon across the global South, particularly in 
respect of economic control of local areas, for instance 
with drug gangs or militias.6 The inability of the South 
African state to address endemic levels of insecurity 
in poor, urban settlements of South Africa, and the 
proliferation of actors pursuing violence, from gangs 
to vigilante organisations to moments of popular 
mobilisation such as xenophobic attacks, reveal the 
relevance of armed, non-state actors to local rule in 
South Africa.
With this in mind, we return to Arjona’s typology, where 
‘rebelocracy’ refers to a high degree of intervention 
by armed groups in civilian affairs, and a sense of a 
social contract between the armed group and the 
local population. This would include the provision of 
services similar to those provided by a state, as well 
as other symbols of state-like power, such as a flag or 
nationalist symbols. On the other end of the typology, 
Arjona identifies ‘aliocracy’ as a narrow range of 
interventions by armed groups in civilian affairs, and 
a social contract between the armed group and the 
local population, such as militia expelling drug gangs 
from the favelas of Rio. The lack of a social contract 
between armed groups and the local population would 
fall into ‘disorder’ in Arjona’s typology. 
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We suggest that since its formation in the early 
1990s, Imizamo Yethu has been slipping from a form 
of ‘aliocracy’ under a relatively strong civic leadership, 
towards ‘disorder’ with the weakening of SANCO and 
local state rule. This is despite the fact that SANCO is 
closely identified with the African National Congress 
(ANC) at local level. Notably, however, the ANC’s 
legitimacy remains in place through the influence of 
national ideas and racialised experiences of life in 
Hout Bay, rather than through legitimate local political 
leadership and effective rule in Imizamo Yethu. The 
possible exception to this trend is the recent anti-
drug gang mobilisation which has, paradoxically, 
strengthened both SANCO and its relations with the 
local police on the back of an implicit anti-crime social 
contract with the residents of Imizamo Yethu. How 
long this will last is hard to say. 
Key to understanding local politics in Imizamo Yethu 
is the fact that this is an ANC-aligned community in 
a city that has been run by the Democratic Alliance 
(DA) since 2006, and in a province that has been run 
by the DA since 2009. As argued elsewhere,7 this 
has placed significant strain on relations between 
community leaders and the city and province, as 
SANCO’s partisan identity threatens rather than 
reinforces its claim to legitimate leadership of Imizamo 
Yethu in the eyes of these two spheres of the state. 
Conversely, DA governance desires ‘non-partisan’ 
community representation, an approach attempted 
in Imizamo Yethu by the SANCO leadership of 2007 
until this undermined their relations with the local 
ANC, and they were eventually supplanted in 2015 by 
a clearly more partisan group. These dynamics, we 
suggest, are mostly driven by the larger logic of race 
and party politics in South Africa, and thus it seems 
likely that tensions between the DA province and city 
and SANCO will continue into the future, potentially 
undermining local rule in Imizamo Yethu, and leading 
from the current state of ‘aliocracy’ back down the 
path to disorder. 
Arjona, Kalyvas et al. and Davis make the case that 
contexts of civil war and political violence cannot 
be treated as homogenous political spaces, and 
this is also consistent with our argument – that the 
informal nature of governance within the settlement 
means that political rule is not only about the 
state, or one form of state/non-state rule, but 
may vary significantly across place. In this regard 
the dominant party literature on the South African 
political system is particularly useful. Thus Butler8 
suggests that the enduring rule by the ANC in South 
Africa, arguably reinforced by race politics where 
the ANC is seen as the leader of black people, 
leads to a blurring of party and state, with a range 
of positive benefits for governance but negative 
consequences for accountability. On the one hand, 
the ANC’s popularity means it can make unpopular 
but wise long-term policy choices on, for example, 
land reform, but on the other, it can ignore a public 
outcry about unpopular choices or corrupt practices. 
Some scholars have pointed to the role of liberation 
nationalism and the access to state resources in 
cementing the idea of a ‘party-state’, where racial 
identity (black African), political party (ANC) and 
state power are seen as both instrumentally and 
normatively linked.9 
At the local level, we can add the notion of ‘party-
society’ that conjoins racial identity, political party 
and community leadership.10 This leadership is not 
exercised by the ANC alone, but also by its allies, 
often in the form of SANCO. In this context, the claim 
that the ANC (and its allies) is entitled to rule as the 
historic champion of oppressed black South Africans 
is reinforced at local level by the dependency of poor 
communities on the ANC-run state for development. 
Consequently, as Benit-Gbaffou notes, the most 
reliable way of accessing the state for most poor, 
black communities throughout the country is often 
through networks in the party rather than state 
channels.11 It is often these informal networks that 
mediate state-society relations, more than formal 
processes or structures are able to.
As already noted, in Imizamo Yethu the link between 
party and state has been weakened with the advent 
of the DA to political power in the city and in the 
province. While this has weakened state patronage 
to local Imizamo Yethu leaders through the party, it 
has not necessarily weakened the popularity of the 
ANC. A key reason for this centres on the politics 
of development, in particular the long struggle 
over what to do with the vacant land adjacent to 
Imizamo Yethu.12  The debate centres on whether 
to build community-specific facilities like a school, 
as advocated by leaders of the white community, 
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or build more houses and have Imizamo Yethu 
children attending schools in other parts of Hout 
Bay, as advocated by SANCO. The vision of the 
white community is seen by Imizamo Yethu leaders 
as an attempt to entrench racial segregation in Hout 
Bay, rather than challenge it by constructing one set 
of schools, clinics and other public facilities for all 
residents. It is offered as evidence of white racism. 
Thus the politics of race, party and place reinforces a 
form of political cohesion in Imizamo Yethu despite, 
or even because of, weak local rule. 
In addition, violence in Imizamo Yethu is more 
commonly practiced by non-political actors, who are 
not obviously connected to local leadership. The one 
exception here has been the anti-gang mobilisation, 
which has brought the community, SANCO and the 
police together through the use of violence against 
criminals. This exceptional moment brings us to 
the question of social cohesion. Social cohesion is 
fundamentally a normative concept that prescribes a 
shared sense of morality, purpose and order within a 
particular context. Thus Forest and Kearns state:
Social cohesion can emphasise the need for a 
shared sense of morality and common purpose; 
aspects of social control and social order; the 
threat to social solidarity of income and wealth 
inequalities between people, groups and places; 
the level of social interaction within communities 
or families; and a sense of belonging to place. 
By implication, a society lacking cohesion 
would be one which displayed social disorder 
and conflict, disparate moral values, extreme 
social inequality, low levels of social interaction 
between and within communities and low levels 
of place attachment.13 
Other research on urban neighbourhoods in Chicago 
shows that more organised and socially cohesive 
localities may have higher levels of organised 
violence, as the levels of mutuality and social 
networks provide a resource for violent actors.14 The 
authors make the case for ‘negotiated co-existence’, 
which could be seen to correspond to Arjona’s type 
of aliocracy. However, as we will show, neither of 
these categories fully capture the realities of the 
relationship between violence, regimes of authority 
and local order in Imizamo Yethu. The key point 
here is that most of the evidence points to uneven 
and transitory forms of social cohesion, in which 
violence is used both to enforce a notion of social 
cohesion (e.g. by expelling certain foreigners) and 
to unravel a sense of social cohesion (e.g. high 
levels of insecurity due to crime and interpersonal 
violence). The overall levels of violence are high, 
but not highly politicised. Instead, violence is tied 
to everyday crime, inter-personal relations and 
business competition (e.g. taxi violence).
Cohesion, violence, insecurity and 
(dis)order in Imizamo Yethu
The analysis that follows is presented on the basis 
of evidence gathered over a period of five years 
in several different research projects. In 2011 we 
conducted a representative household survey of 
Imizamo Yethu, interviewing 306 respondents on 
mostly demographic and livelihoods issues. That 
same year we also embarked on a participatory 
action research project exploring insecurity that 
involved five participatory focus groups in addition 
to a week-long digital story-telling workshop with 
11 residents. From 2012 to 2015 we conducted 
over two dozen in-depth elite interviews with 
SANCO, ANC leaders, non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) staff, community organisers, 
local government officials and leaders of the 
migrant community on projects dealing with 
housing, transport, xenophobia, and waste and 
water. In addition, we have kept a close eye on 
the local media, both print and social, in relation to 
these themes. 
Social cohesion
Central to the Forest and Kearns account of social 
cohesion are shared norms, identities, order, 
equality, solidarity and sense of belonging. While 
at its formation in 1991, with just 450 families, 
Imizamo Yethu was sometimes described in these 
terms, today most long-standing residents explicitly 
contrast the plurality, mobility, diversity, violence and 
disorder of the present unfavourably with the social 
order of the past. Demographically it is clear that 
Imizamo Yethu has changed tremendously in 20 
years, growing at a rate of nearly 1 000 new people 
a year to about 25 000 people today.15 When asked 
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in 2011 how many people live in Imizamo Yethu, the 
most common response from our 306 householders 
was ‘too many’. Further, most of the residents 
are migrants, mostly from the Eastern Cape, but 
increasingly from the rest of Africa.16 
In addition to growing quickly, Imizamo Yethu has 
also become more diverse, and obviously so, with 
foreign nationals prevalent in the informal business 
sector in the township, especially Somalis in spaza 
shops, Namibians in taverns, and Congolese in hair 
salons, and with significant numbers of Angolans, 
Malawians and Zimbabweans resident throughout 
Imizamo Yethu. Along with the diversity of nationalities 
come language and cultural differences that have 
limited the ability of the isiXhosa-speaking majority 
to unite the community in cultural terms. Hence, 
language at community meetings has become an 
issue of contention, as isiXhosa is used rather than 
English, which is also understood by the coloured 
and foreign residents of Imizamo Yethu. The inability 
of SANCO to include foreign residents in its various 
meetings is clear (‘they don’t want us, but we see 
SANCO as a South African thing anyway’.)17 The 
general decline of SANCO has undermined its ability 
to manage increasing diversity. Hence, as one former 
leader put it:
[I]n the 1990s SANCO was strong, every 
meeting had hundreds of people, and we 
controlled everything. It was a good place to 
live. Now people only come to a meeting if 
they’re going to get a house, and people do 
what they want.18 
With this diversity has come greater inequality, as 
many migrants are poorer than more established 
families. Since 2000 the upper slopes of the Oranje 
Kloof mountain have become crammed with shacks 
that number over 4 300, to the roughly 1 100 formal 
houses in Imizamo Yethu.19 Further, local leaders 
complain of having no ability to control migration into 
Imizamo Yethu: ‘People just rent out their backyards, 
and sometimes the whole house to foreigners, 
without telling anyone, so we don’t even know about 
it.’20 Our own experience working with community 
members over a five-year period also suggests a 
significant turnover of residents, with people moving 
in and out of the township at a high rate. This is the 
pattern of ‘churning’ in poorer urban settlements 
more widely in South Africa.21 Thus several of the 
leaders we started working with in 2011 left Imizamo 
Yethu within a couple of years for other townships in 
Cape Town.
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the complexity 
surrounding the relationship between violence and 
social cohesion in Imizamo Yethu comes from the 
ubiquitous levels of insecurity and violence we 
encountered. Indeed, there is a real sense that 
violence is a key social norm, with many respondents 
referring to the need to establish order through 
violence, for example by reducing crime through 
‘community justice’. Hence one respondent wistfully 
longed to return to ‘the old ways’ or ‘sorting people 
out’ when they committed a crime. ‘We caught a thief 
near the school’, he told us one day, ‘and sorted him 
out over there [pointing], and then over there, and 
over there.’22
Crime and insecurity: cats and dogs, not 
the police and SANCO
Overall levels of crime, and interpersonal violence 
in particular, are significant in Imizamo Yethu, and 
contribute to a sense of insecurity in the township. 
Police statistics for Hout Bay indicate an average 
of 13 deaths per year for the last five years.23 This 
amounts to a figure of 26 per 100 000, which, while 
lower than the national average of 33 per 100 000, 
is still high. Our research also suggests that many 
crimes, particularly those related to sexual violence, 
mugging and robbery, are significantly underreported, 
as revealed by many respondents in our workshops 
who related intimate crimes they had not reported to 
the police or even shared with their families. Perhaps 
more striking has been the rise in drug-related crime, 
which has seen a notable spike in the last few years. 
There is more to this than better policing, as many 
respondents reported the emergence of drug gangs 
in Imizamo Yethu for the first time in its history.24
In our participatory workshops, discussions 
highlighted the question of insecurity. Notably, all 
respondents feared crime, especially at night, and in 
all parts of the settlement other than in the section 
where they lived. While respondents felt that ‘the 
police, SANCO/ANC and the community’ should be 
the leading actors in reducing crime, in that order, 
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they reported that those who made the community 
safe were ‘cats and dogs, neighbours and family’, in 
that order. Cats, because they ‘kill rats and mice that 
eat food’, and dogs because ‘they bark at tsotsis’.25 
Despite these general observations, the nature of 
insecurity experienced by respondents changed 
depending on their social positioning. Some with 
resources, like shopkeepers, reported ‘always 
watching for thieves’.26 Certain foreigners (e.g. those 
from Zimbabwe, Malawi and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo) were more vulnerable to violence than 
others (Angola, Namibia) because ‘everyone knows 
the Namibians don’t play. They will fight every time.’27 
Women, especially young women, felt vulnerable at 
night in areas of the township outside their immediate 
neighbourhood, in particular shebeens. There were 
also important differences in perceptions of safety by 
type of housing, with those living in shacks feeling 
more vulnerable than those in formal housing. As 
one woman put it: ‘We live in fear of someone 
kicking down the shack door and raping us.’28 Lastly, 
some respondents reported deliberately befriending 
powerful people in the township to get protection: 
‘I always make friends with gangsters so no-one 
messes with me.’29
This work threw into sharp relief the meaning of 
insecurity and violence for social cohesion and local 
governance. It was clear that these generalised levels 
of insecurity led respondents to see the state, and the 
police and justice system in particular, as inadequate. 
This lack of trust in the state was not replaced by a 
faith in local political actors such as SANCO. Indeed, 
the space of effective security governance, whether 
by state or society, remained mostly a vacuum in 
Imizamo Yethu, at least until the anti-gang violence 
of late 2015 and the nightly community patrols. 
Although some respondents complained that ‘patrols 
sometimes beat up the wrong people’, all agreed that 
they had made the township much safer.30
Taxi violence: amaphela versus 
amahoender 
Generally in Cape Town, taxi associations are 
important role players, as they are well armed, 
organised and relatively wealthy, and have in the 
past been accused of operating in mafia style.31 In 
both Hout Bay and Imizamo Yethu there is a history 
of violent conflict linked to business competition 
between taxi owners,32 as noted above. In 2011 
the conflict we encountered was between two 
informal taxi associations that did local routes around 
Hout Bay, respectively known as the amaphela 
(cockroaches) and amahoender (chickens). After 
much bargaining, they merged in 2013. 
Most recently, a former taxi owner has become the 
chairperson of SANCO, following community protests 
against resettlement linked to building a Bus Rapid 
Transport (BRT) turnaround point on the Wynberg 
route that runs past Imizamo Yethu. Thus, although 
the protest invoked the long-standing demand by 
SANCO for housing rather than other facilities to 
be built on the vacant land in Imizamo Yethu, it also 
coincided with the particular interests of a small group 
of taxi owners yet to be incorporated into the system. 
Despite this, the overwhelming impression we gained 
from respondents over many years’ fieldwork is that 
while taxi owners are influential in Imizamo Yethu, they 
do not control SANCO. As one respondent put it, 
‘they are much too busy making real money to worry 
about small politics’.33
Consequently, our workshops identified taxi 
associations as a source of both insecurity and 
security. At times, taxi associations have been 
drawn in to intervene to protect residents, such as in 
incidents involving street gangs. At other times, taxi 
associations drive violence and insecurity through 
internal disputes, such as the conflict over local 
routes that we stumbled on in 2011. Indeed, this 
lack of clear alignment with both wider community 
agendas and community leaders undermines 
conditions for both social cohesion and effective 
local governance by contributing to a generalised 
sense of unpredictability.
Xenophobic attacks and 
protection rackets
Our 2011 household survey of Imizamo Yethu 
revealed that the vast majority of respondents 
(85%) were South African. This finding runs against 
the received wisdom of many who live in Imizamo 
Yethu that the proportion of foreign migrants in the 
settlement is around 40 to 50%. Our survey findings 
are closer to the 2011 census, which identifies 3.3% 
of the Hout Bay population as ‘other’. Assuming the 
37SA Crime QuArterly No. 55 • mAr 2016
vast majority of the ‘other’ live in Imizamo Yethu, this 
would be about 7% of the settlement – roughly half of 
what we found. Notably, a 2003 Development Action 
Group survey found just 5% of Imizamo Yethu were 
foreign nationals, so our 2011 figure is a threefold 
increase in eight years.34 Although this uncertainty 
around the number of African migrants in Imizamo 
Yethu is unresolvable without more careful research, 
the available evidence suggests that it is probably 
closer to the 20% mark (4 000 people) rather than the 
40% (8 000 people) often invoked by Imizamo Yethu 
residents and local leaders in public forums. 
While many foreign-born residents experience 
violence in Imizamo Yethu, there are many reasons 
to believe that it is not always about national identity. 
Foreign residents as well as South African nationals 
experience everyday crime, business competition, 
personal conflicts and the like. However, there is no 
doubt that xenophobia is real, as reported by many 
foreign residents. We also encountered this first 
hand when a digital storytelling workshop collapsed 
after conflict between South African and foreign 
participants.35 In addition, Imizamo Yethu has been 
the site of several attempts to expel foreign residents 
by mobs threatening violence; the most substantial 
of which was during the 2008 xenophobic wave 
that swept the country.36 Notably, the only time we 
encountered stories of protection rackets against 
foreign nationals in Imizamo Yethu was in respect of 
allegations that certain ANC Youth League members 
approached foreign shopkeepers in the wake of 
expulsions in order to extort money for protection – 
with the implication that they could prevent (or incite) 
xenophobic violence. 
While the ambivalence among South Africans 
towards foreign nationals clearly undermines a shared 
sense of belonging in Imizamo Yethu, and thus social 
cohesion, it also weakens local rule. This is not only 
because of the ambivalence of local leaders towards 
foreign nationals but also because many residents 
know that foreign nationals are less likely to go to 
the police when robbed, as many feel vulnerable to 
state persecution due to inadequate documentation. 
Indeed, this exclusion from rule is also manifest in 
the reluctance of the vast majority of foreign-born 
residents to participate in SANCO structures, thus 
further parsing representation in Imizamo Yethu rule 
along national lines. 
Service delivery protests: houses 
or buses?
Compared to most townships, Imizamo Yethu has a 
relatively limited history of service delivery protests,37 
excluding the xenophobic and vigilante attacks 
already discussed. However, the most recent one 
occurred in April 2015 when a community protest 
led to the destruction of eight aluminium-framed 
houses built by the City of Cape Town for families 
who were going to be displaced by a MyCiti Bus 
Rapid Transport (BRT) turnaround station planned for 
the northern entrance to Imizamo Yethu. According 
to a leader of SANCO, ‘the city could not explain why 
these few people had got housing ahead of others 
who have been waiting for years … also why was 
MyCiti going where we had agreed there would be 
housing? This angered the community and we tore 
them down.’38 
This story is consistent with accounts of service 
delivery protests that identify both the failure to deliver 
and poor communication by municipalities as key 
reasons for protest.39 Indeed, if we return to the taxi 
conflict we encountered on the first day we entered 
IY in 2011, the two groups of SANCO leaders 
involved in that were divided by the issue of housing. 
Where one group had supported the building of a 
new school instead of houses, the other saw this 
as selling out. The issue was not just that they were 
taking the side of the ‘white’ DA-run city, but also that 
the decision to build community facilities specifically 
for Imizamo Yethu, rather than share existing ones in 
the white area, would further racially segregate Hout 
Bay. As one leader put it: ‘We are all Hout Baynians, 
we should share the same facilities.’40 The complaint 
that the white residents of Hout Bay were racist and 
did not want black people in ‘their area’ was one 
made frequently by one SANCO faction at the time, 
as well as by local ANC leaders. 
At the same time, however, there was more than 
race politics driving the anti-BRT protests of 2015, 
as some of the key SANCO leaders involved 
also have interests in the taxi industry, and are 
potentially threatened by the extension of the BRT 
to Wynberg. Thus, while this protest represented a 
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moment in a longer struggle over access to housing 
and integration into Hout Bay, it also provided an 
opportunity for some local elites to pursue personal 
interests. This is a good example of what Von Holdt 
terms as ‘protests within protests’,41 and potentially 
undermines faith in SANCO to reliably champion 
all the residents of Hout Bay. Indeed, the claim of 
corruption was publicly wielded by various local 
leaders in Imizamo Yethu. Paradoxically then, service 
delivery politics and protest do not necessarily unite 
Imizamo Yethu, and may even exacerbate rivalry for 
local leadership.  
At the same time, however, the weakening of SANCO 
and enduring conflicts over housing and other 
forms of development in Imizamo Yethu have not 
undermined the ANC at election time. As revealed 
by an examination of national election results for the 
two Imizamo Yethu voting districts, ANC popularity 
has remained constant at just below 90% since 1999 
(Table 1) and indeed, voter turnout in Imizamo Yethu 
has increased with every national election, and is 
comparable to the white community who live in the 
valley (Figure 1). Indeed, this is not just a phenomenon 
of national elections; a similar positive trend is evident 
Voting district Venue 1999 ANC 2004 ANC 2009 ANC 2014 ANC
97130684
Hout Bay Christian 
Community Association
86.15% 88.89% 82.51% 86.49%
97130022 Gospel Outreach Ministries 87.01% 87.35% 84.97% 86.72%
Table 1:  ANC national election results Imizamo Yethu voting districts 1999–2014
2000 2006 2011
DA 57.62% 48.67% 51.90%
ANC 31.40% 39.68% 43.94%
ID 0.00% 7.50% 0.00%
ACDP 2.57% 1.18% 0.33%
Table 2: Party vote Hout Bay, local government elections 2000–2011
Figure 1: Voter turnout for three communities of Hout Bay, 1999–2014  
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in support for the ANC in local government elections 
in Hout Bay (Table 2). Whatever the travails of SANCO 
and weak rule, the ANC remains electorally strong in 
Imizamo Yethu.
Conclusion
The pervasive and varied nature of violence in Imizamo 
Yethu is implicated in complex dynamics of order 
and rule, such that there is no simple relationship 
between violence and social cohesion. Most recently, 
popular mobilisation against drug gangs led to the 
deaths of the gang leaders at the hands of a mob, 
and ongoing nightly patrols by the community. These 
events appear to have re-established a form of social 
cohesion between the community, SANCO leaders 
and the police around the violent repression of crime. 
However, this moment represents an exception in the 
history of rule in Imizamo Yethu over the last 10 years, 
where local leadership and local rule have become 
increasingly weak. Notably, during this period neither 
local rule nor the contest for leadership were settled 
through violence. 
Key to explaining these paradoxes, we suggest, is 
the disjuncture between local leaders in Imizamo 
Yethu and the local state. Thus, unlike much of the 
rest of South Africa, identification with the ANC in 
Imizamo Yethu is a disadvantage in accessing the 
DA-run city and province, and hence the patronage 
available through the ‘party state’ is limited. At the 
same time, though, the exclusion felt by Imizamo 
Yethu leaders, best represented in the struggles over 
housing and racial segregation in Hout Bay, reinforces 
the idea that the ANC is the true champion of the 
racially oppressed black people of South Africa. Thus 
weak local rule poses no threat to ANC popularity, 
and under certain circumstances may even reinforce 
it. Ironically it is the popular demand for security, 
manifest in the anti-drug mobilisation of 2015, that 
has disrupted the slide from ‘aliocracy’ to ‘disorder’ 
in Imizamo Yethu. However, it seems doubtful 
whether this powerful moment of social cohesion can 
indefinitely withstand the wider partisan logic of state 
patronage and race politics. 
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